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Labour Market Mismatch Among UK Graduates: 
An Analysis Using REFLEX Data 
 
There is much disagreement in the literature over the extent to which graduates are 
mismatched in the labour market and the reasons for this. In this paper we utilise the Flexible 
Professional in the Knowledge Society (REFLEX) data set to cast light on these issues, 
based on data for UK graduates. REFLEX examines the labour market status of graduates 
five years after graduation and distinguishes between first and current job, vertical and 
horizontal mismatch, over/underqualification and over/underskilling as well as including a 
range of questions on the nature of work organisation and individual competences. We find 
substantial pay penalties for over-education for both sexes and for overskilling in the case of 
men only. When both education and skill mismatch variables are included together in the 
model only overskilling reduces job satisfaction consistently for both sexes. Using job 
attributes data it appears that the lower wages of the overqualified may in part simply 
represent a compensating wage differential for positive job attributes, while for men at least 
there are real costs to being overskilled. 
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There is considerable controversy over the extent to which graduates are 
mismatched or not in the labour market. Studies using measures of 
overeducation generally find, on the basis of subjective responses to survey 
questions directed at employees, that a substantial proportion of graduates are 
employed in jobs for which a degree is not required. Thus, Green and Zhu 
(2008), using UK Skills Surveys data show that overqualification among 
graduates rose from 21.2% in 1992 to 33.2% in 2006. Battu, Belfield and 
Sloane (1999)  and Dolton and Vignoles (2000), among others,  show that 
overqualified graduates have lower earnings compared to others with the same 
qualifications, but who are properly matched, though their earnings are higher 
than those of their matched co-workers. Overqualified workers also report 
lower job satisfaction than properly matched workers. However, interpretation 
of such results derived from subjective employee responses to survey 
questions is not straightforward. Certain jobs may specify a minimum 
educational requirement and if this is below degree level a graduate may well 
give a response which indicates he or she is overeducated, though a degree 
may be the preferred qualification for the job, given sufficient applicants. A 
further possibility is that educational requirements for particular jobs are rising 
over time, so that a degree may not have been required when a graduate 
obtained the job, though it is currently required. Without appropriate questions 
this may not be picked up. A further problem is that an individual may be 
overqualified because of low ability for that level of qualification. This may 
well be consistent with the efficient functioning of the labour market rather 
than indicating a form of market failure. An alternative interpretation is that 
certain individuals may have chosen non graduate employment because it 
offers compensating advantages such as a preferred location or less stressful 
work. Further, alternative definitions of graduate jobs can produce results 
which conflict with those in the literature above. Thus, Gottschalk and Hansen 
(2003), defined a graduate job in terms of whether the proportion of graduates 
in an occupation exceeded 90% or, failing that, graduates in that occupation 
obtained a significant pay premium of at least 10% over non-graduates. They 
  1found that the proportion of US graduates in non-graduate jobs was actually 
declining over time, whereas the earlier overeducation literature had suggested 
the reverse. Using the same model Grazier, O’Leary and Sloane (2008) 
obtained a very similar result for the UK. Recent data sets have included 
questions which enable one to estimate the degree of overskilling and this may 
be a more appropriate variable for picking up variations in individual ability, 
since an individual who is overqualified, but not overskilled may be 
appropriately allocated to a particular occupation. 
In this paper we utilise the REFLEX survey in order to attempt to unravel 
some of the issues identified above. The paper should been seen as extending 
earlier work. Thus, Allen, Badillo-Amador and van der Velden (2006)  used 
REFEX data from nine countries to show that educational and skill 
mismatches were rather weakly related. This was confirmed by Green and 
McIntosh (2007), using UK data. Chevalier (2003) distinguished between 
those who were in a non-graduate job but satisfied with it (the apparently 
overeducated ) and those who were  similarly matched but not satisfied with it 
(the genuinely overeducated) . The wage penalty for being overeducated was 
much lower in the latter case. Chevalier and Lindley (2009) used a 1995 
cohort of UK graduates, interviewed in 2002/3, based on four digit 
occupations to differentiate between graduate and non-graduate jobs. They 
found that the genuinely overeducated possessed significantly less 
management and leadership skills than those who were only apparently so. 
Green and Zhu (2008) distinguished between ‘real’ and ‘formal’ 
overqualification on the basis of whether the overqualification was 
accompanied by skill underutilisation or not, finding that pay penalties were 
substantially greater for the real overqualification group than for the formal 
one. 
Using REFLEX we are able to cast further light on these issues by focusing on 
the UK and making use of the richness of data on graduate employment, 
which distinguishes between first and current job, vertical and horizontal 
mismatch, over/underqualification and over/underskilling as well as a range of 
questions on the nature of work organisation and individual competencies. 
  2 
2. The  Data 
 
The Flexible Professional in the Knowledge Society (REFLEX) project was 
financed as a Specific Targeted Research Project (STREP) of the European 
Union’s Sixth Framework Programme covering 15 countries. It is limited to 
graduates in the 1999/2000 academic year, who were interviewed five years 
later in 2005. We focus on UK graduates only for a number of reasons. First, 
this allows for a more direct comparison with some of the studies referred to 
above. Second, the UK is somewhat atypical in having the highest proportion 
of graduates in any of the countries in the survey failing to utilise their skills. 
Third, the UK sample consists mainly of those with a bachelors degree, while 
in many other countries the sample consists mainly or wholly of those with a 
masters degree. This means that the UK graduates tend to have spent less time 
in higher education and to be much younger on average at time of graduation 
than in the other countries (see Brennan (2008)).   
 
With respect to the data used here, we restrict our sample to those individuals 
currently employed who had studied on a full-time basis while at University.  
As a result of these exclusions the effective sample falls from 1,578 to 1,123. 
Individuals were defined as overeducated if they indicated that a below 
tertiary level of education was most appropriate for the job. Conversely, they 
were deemed to be undereducated if the most appropriate level of education 
was below that actually acquired. Overskilling was based on the response to a 
question asking individuals to rate on a 1 to 5 scale
1 the extent to which their 
skills and knowledge were utilised in their work with a response of 1 or 2 
deemed consistent with overskilling. Using the same scale, workers were 
deemed to be underskilled if they responded 4 or 5 to a question indicating 
that their job demanded more knowledge and skills than they could actually 
                                                 
1 Where 1 was not at all and 5 to a very high extent. 
  3offer.  Summary statistics for the UK sample are provided in the appendix; 
however, some aspects of the data are worth noting at this point.  In the UK 
36% felt they were overeducated in their initial job compared to 14% 
elsewhere in Europe and 20% felt that their particular field of study was 
directly required in their initial job, compared to 29% elsewhere. Further, 33% 
of UK graduates believed that their higher education skills had not been fully 
utilised in their initial job, compared to 17% elsewhere. However,  when we 
turn to employment in current job the UK figures for both overeducation and 
overskilling fell to 14% compared to 7% and 10% elsewhere suggesting that 
some convergence had taken place. Thus, overall, it is clear that UK graduates 
still believe that they are less well prepared for employment than other 
graduates. However, it is unclear to what extent these differences reflect 





In terms of the methodological approach adopted here, we make an assessment 
of the extent to which the alternative forms of mismatch are genuine by 
assessing their impacts on both wages and job satisfaction. Checks are also 
carried out to ensure that our estimates are not affected by biases relating to 
either sample selection or unobserved individual heterogeneity.  We then go 
on to exploit a unique aspect of the data to test for compensating differentials 
before attempting to make some assessment of the specific skill areas where 
overskilling may occur.  
 
First, we estimate a wage equation of the form 
ED SK
12 3 i gw X D D =α +α +α +ε    lo   [1] 
  4Where   equals a vector of personal and structural characteristics, 
ED D 
equals over and under-education dummies, 
SK D  equals over- and 
underskilling dummies and  i
X
ε  is an iid error term. 
ED D  and 
SK D a r e  f i r s t  
entered separately and then jointly to determine the extent to which any 
negative wage effect is influenced by the presence of the other. These 
equations are run for the whole sample and separately by gender. 
1 i   [3] 
We then adopt a propensity score matching (PSM) model with control and 
treatment groups to identify any unobserved heterogeneity bias, where the 
propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of receiving a 
treatment given certain determining characteristics 
p(X) Pr{D 1/ X} E{D/ X} ===      [2] 
 
where  is a binary term indicating exposure to the treatment and   is a 
vector of determining characteristics. On the grounds that both overeducation 
and overskilling may be associated with unobserved factors, such as lower 
ability, we exploit the data on first job to ensure that the control group will 
consist of individuals mismatched in first job but matched in current job. To 
the extent that either form of mismatch is associated with unobserved factors, 
these will be constant across the control and treatment groups ensuring the 
robustness of our estimates. Further sensitivity analysis is then applied to our 
PSM estimates to ensure that they are free from the effects on individual 
unobserved heterogeneity bias. 
D X
 
Next, we estimate a probit model of the effect of graduate overeducation or 
undereducation and graduate overskilling and underskilling on job satisfaction 
 
*E D S K XD D E =β +β +β +     i1 i 2 i 3 i S
 
where  i is a latent variable which denotes an individual’s probability of 
being satisfied at work based on responses to a job satisfaction question. 
S
  5Again the education and skill mismatch variables are initially inserted 
ismatch variables on various job attributes to establish 




tionship between the possession of 
particular skill competencies and both wages and job satisfaction equations 
kill competency variables. 
4. 
 
                                                
separately and then jointly. 
 
We then regress on m
w
ED SK
i1 i2 i 3 i 2 i JA X D D =γ +γ +γ +ε      [4] 




Table 1 reports the results from the wage regressions. We estimate four 
specifications. Specification 1 contains only standard controls, specification 2 
includes overeducation and undereducation controls, and specification 3 
contains overskilling and underskilling controls with the final specifications 
including all controls. Specification 4 is then estimated separately for males 
and females.   Turning firstly to specification 1, the model itself is well 
specified with all covariates behaving according to prior expectations. Males 
were found to earn a wage premium of nine percent, while faculty effects were 
limited with only education and agriculture / veterinary graduates earning 
significantly less than the base case
2. The returns to a first class or two one 
degree were 14 and 8 per cent respectively, while respondents who obtained 
Masters degrees earned 13 per cent more than those who did not. Other 
variables of interest included a post-graduation unemployment spell, which 
reduced earnings by 12 per cent and public sector employment, which was 
associated with a 10 percent penalty. Earnings were found to rise with the 
number of hours worked, supervisory responsibilities and employment in a 
large firm. Having more than one employer since graduation tended to depress 
 
2 This consists of graduates from backgrounds such as Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction and 
Services. 
  6earnings, suggesting that frictional job search activity early in one’s career 
may be costly. The data also contain some interesting controls for horizontal 
mismatch and course content / prestige. With respect to horizontal mismatch, 
there was no consistent evidence to suggest that being in a job that was either 
fully or partially aligned with the subjects studied on the degree programme 
increased earnings in any way
3.  In terms of course content / prestige, while 
vocationally orientated degrees or those well known to employers were 
associated with no wage premiums / penalties, respondents who had graduated 
from degree programmes that were considered prestigious earned 12 per cent 
 
reported in other studies; however, this is most likely explained by the fact that 
                                                
more.  
When the overeducation and undereducation variables are added to the model 
(Specification 2), at almost 40 per cent, there was evidence of a large pay 
penalty to being overeducated in one’s current job. However, no wage effects 
were evident for overeducation in first job or undereducation in any job. 
Further, when specification 2 was re-estimated without controls for current 
over / undereducation, a significant wage penalty of 13 per cent was found for 
overeducation in first job, confirming that previous and current overeducation 
are highly correlated. In specification 3, the pay penalty to being overskilled in 
current job was, at 22 per cent, almost half that of the comparable 
overeducation figure.  Workers who were underskilled in their current 
employment earned a 9 per cent premium relative to their matched 
counterparts, while there was no evidence of any wage effects related to skill 
mismatch during initial employment. The controls for skill mismatch in first 
job remained insignificant when the current mismatch variables were dropped 
from the model, suggesting a somewhat less persistent wage effect. When the 
model was estimated containing all mismatch controls (Specification 4) the 
pay penalties associated with overeducation and overskilling in current job fell 
to 34 and 10 per cent respectively, while the pay premium to underskilling in 
current job remained unchanged.  The magnitude of the adjustment in the 
overeducation and overskilling pay penalties is somewhat larger than those 
 
3 The 11 per cent premium observed for full horizontal match in specification 1 became statistically 
insignificant in the more detailed specifications.  
  7the relationship between both subjective variables is much stronger than that 
reported in these earlier studies,
4 suggesting the existence of important 
measurement differences.   
 
rskilled workers earn a wage comparable to their matched 
counterparts.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
s 
will also be robust with respect to unobserved individual heterogeneity bias.  
 
                                                
When the data were split according to gender the results showed that, while 
both sexes incurred large wage penalties if overeducated in current job, only 
males incurred a significant loss as a consequence of current overskilling. 
Therefore, the results suggest that the pay implications of skill mismatch are 
much lower than those of educational mismatch and, in the case of UK female 
graduates, ove
While the evidence from the wage equations suggest that skill mismatch 
among graduates is potentially much less of a policy concern relative to 
educational mismatch, some checks are necessary to ensure the reliability of 
these results. Some previous studies on overeducation have suggested that the 
pay penalty observed in OLS models is upwardly biased as a consequence of 
either selection bias (Dolton and Silles, 2002) or unobserved heterogeneity, 
generally attributed to lower ability levels of mismatched workers (Bauer, 
2002, Chevalier, 2003).  To ensure the robustness of our estimates we adopt an 
approach centred on propensity score models (PSM). Under this approach we 
match individuals with like characteristics and, therefore, deal directly with 
any concerns relating to sample selection. Furthermore, within our estimation 
procedure we incorporate each individual’s history of job mismatch, so that 
the control group will consist of individuals who were mismatched in their 
first job but are now matched. Therefore, to the extent that overeducation or 
overskilling is associated with unobserved factors, these will be constant 
across both the control and treatment groups, implying that the PSM estimate
 
4 Green and McIntosh (2007) find a correlation between overeducation and overskilling of 0.2 
compared to 0.48 here. 
  8Table 2 reports the marginal effects from the probit estimations describing 
overskilling and overeducation in current job respectively.  The models are 
well specified with the overall overskilling and overeducation models 
reporting pseudo R
2 statistics of 0.24 and 0.34 respectively. As expected, 
mismatch in first job is a strong predictor of mismatch in current job, 
especially for overeducation. On the whole, the relationship between current 
and previous mismatch appears stronger for males, particularly those who 
were overeducated in first employment suggesting higher levels of persistent 
mismatch among this grouping. With respect to the other covariates, a number 
of factors were found to influence both education and skill mismatch including 
horizontal mismatch,  a history of unemployment, age, not being employed in 
a research intensive firm and having completed a non-prestigious degree 
 
y closely with those of the OLS, 
suggesting that our original estimates were not affected by either selection or 
 
programme.   
The OLS and PSM estimates are compared in Table 3. Post estimation tests 
were carried out to ensure that the data were sufficient for the control and 
treatment groups to be balanced on all covariates. Holding constant the 
variables included in the stage one probits, the PSM estimates are comparable 
with those of specifications 2 and 3 in table 1. Given that no particular PSM 
methodology is generally accepted as superior, the Nearest Neighbour (with 
replacement), Radius and Kernel matching techniques were all used. The 
results of the PSM estimations align ver
unobserved individual heterogeneity bias.  
In order to ensure robustness, further checks with respect to unobserved 
heterogeneity were achieved by carrying out a sensitivity analysis using 
Rosenbaum bounds for unobserved heterogeneity at various levels of e
γ. The 
bounds allow us to assess the extent to which an unobserved variable must 
influence the selection process in order to render the matching estimates 
unreliable. The test again suggests that results are likely to be robust to such 
effects. For instance, at e
γ  = 1.7 (e
γ  =2) our overskilling (overeducation) 
estimate of -24.7 (-37.6) generated by the kernel estimation method was still 
  9reliable at a 95 per cent level of confidence. The basic intuition here is that 
even in the event of an unobserved factor increasing the likelihood of over-
skilling by a factor of 70 per cent, or in excess of 100 per cent in the case of 
overeducation, our estimate of a wage effect remains reliable at a 95 per cent 
confidence level
5. The results seem particularly strong given that sensitivity 
analysis on the Card and Krueger (1995) minimum wage study found that 
results become unrelia f  1.34 to 1.5 (Rosenbaum, 
2002). 
 
 for Spain Badillo Amador, Nicolas 
and Vila (2008) also find that skill mismatches are a better predictor of job 
 
                                                
ble between e
γ  values o
< Insert Table 2 here > 
 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
It is clear that overeducation and overskilling, although correlated, can be 
considered as distinct events, given that the wage effects of one are not 
entirely incorporated by those of the other. To explore this matter further, we 
regress both the educational and skills mismatch variable on a measure of job 
satisfaction contained within the data 
6. The rationale here is that reductions in 
job satisfaction will more accurately reflect the extent to which any particular 
form of mismatch is perceived as a problem for the individual.  The existence 
of wage penalties in themselves do not make the case for policy intervention 
given the possibility that individuals may choose to trade off lower wages for 
other aspects of the job, such as increased flexibility, job autonomy,  status 
etc. Previous studies have found that overeducated workers have lower levels 
of job satisfaction (Battu, Belfield and Sloane (1999), Fleming and Kler 
(2007). However, for Britain, Green and Zhu (2008) find that 
overqualification is not a problem for job satisfaction in itself if it is not 
accompanied by skill mismatch. Similarly,
satisfaction than educational mismatches. 
 
5 Results available from the authors. 
6 Respondents were asked to rate how satisfied they were with their current work on a scale of one to 5 
where 1 was very dissatisfied and 5 very satisfied. Graduates who responded 4 or 5 were deemed to be 
satisfied.  
  10The results from the REFLEX data suggest that both overeducation and 
overskilling, when included in the model independently of each other, lower 
substantially  levels of job satisfaction (Table 3 specifications 1 and 2). When 
educational mismatch controls only are included in the model, overeducation 
in current job reduces the probability of job satisfaction by 27 per cent 
(Specification 2). With respect to skills mismatch, when estimated in a model 
without educational mismatch controls, overskilling in current job was found 
to reduce the likelihood of job satisfaction by 30 per cent (Specification 3). 
When both educational and skills mismatch variables were included in a 
model we find that only overskilling in current job still reduces the probability 
of job satisfaction by 25 per cent, while the effect of overeducation declines 
even more to 17 per cent (Specification 3). Workers who were underskilled in 
their current job enjoyed higher levels of job satisfaction, with the result more 
pronounced for females. The results from specification 4 suggest that both 
overskilling and overeducation can be considered as a policy concern as they 
reduce both wages and job satisfaction. However, while overskilling has 
negative consequences for both males and females the overeducation 
coefficient in the female regression is significant only at the 90 per cent level, 
 
nt overeducation may prove to be a voluntary phenomenon. 
However, this does not appear to be the case with respect to overskilling, as it 
is found to lower job satisfaction levels despite having a much smaller impact 
 
 
casting some doubt on the extent to which education mismatch is considered 
problematic among female graduates.  
The observation that overeducated workers, despite suffering a more 
significant wage disadvantage relative to overskilled workers, have a higher 
likelihood of job satisfaction suggests that such workers could be engaging in 
some level of trade-off between earnings and other aspects of their job. Thus, 
to some exte
on earnings.  
< Insert Table 4 here > 
The data at hand allow us to explore the compensating differentials issue in 
more detail.  The REFLEX questionnaire asks individuals to rank the extent to 
  11which the following job characteristics are important to them: work autonomy, 
job security, learning, earnings, the presentation of new challenges, career 
prospects, allowing time for leisure activities, social status, societal value and 
allowing time for family tasks.  Workers were then asked to assess the extent 
to which these job characteristics occurred within their current employment.  
With respect to testing for compensating differentials, it not sufficient to 
examine the value that individuals place on certain job characteristics, given 
that this will not guarantee that the individual is actually employed in a job 
exhibiting such a factor. Similarly, the fact that a worker is in a job exhibiting 
various characteristics does not automatically suggest that all such factors 
were primary drivers in the individual’s decision to take the job.  To test 
adequately for compensating differentials we must observe both that a 
particular job characteristic is of importance to the individual and that the 
individual is located in a job exhibiting such a characteristic.  Consequently, 
we interact both REFLEX variables to achieve such a measure
7.  We then 
regress our mismatch variables on the various job attributes to assess the 
extent to which overeducated workers may be trading off higher earnings for 
other aspects of employment.  However, before proceeding to the econometric 
analysis, it is worth discussing the distribution of these newly created 
variables.  Somewhat surprisingly, only 7 per cent of respondents placed a 
high importance on and were in jobs exhibiting high earnings. The graduates 
in the sample were much more likely to value, and be employed in jobs that 
offered the opportunity to learn new skills, work autonomously, that had 
career prospects and societal value. Job security was also of high importance, 
particularly for females, while 10 per cent of workers placed a high emphasis 
 
                                                
and were employed in jobs that allowed a balance with family life, with this 
factor again proving more important for females (Data appendix).  
The results from the probit analysis are reported for all workers in tables 5a 
and 5b, then separately for males (females) in tables 6a and 6b (7a and 7b).  
The results from the pooled analysis appear intuitively sound (Tables 5a and 
 
7 In both questions respondents are asked to provide a response on a one to five scale where 1 was not 
at all important (does not apply at all) and 5 very important (applies to a very high extent).  The binary 
variables were based on a response of 5 and the dependent variables in our models were derived from 
the interaction of these two binary controls.  
  125b). For instance, males were less likely to place a high emphasis on and be in 
jobs that were secure or allowed a balanced family life, while individuals who 
worked more hours tended to be more concerned with achieving higher wages 
and career progression than balancing family or leisure commitments.  Public 
sector workers placed a high importance on and tended to be in jobs that 
allowed a family / leisure balance, were secure, had a high social status, career 
prospects, societal value and presented new challenges. Individuals employed 
in high-tech / R&D intensive establishments were more likely to place the 
emphasis on and be employed in jobs that involved learning, that were career 
progressive and presented new challenges. With respect to the mismatch 
variables the results confirm that overeducated workers place a high 
importance on and are more likely to be employed in jobs that offer security, 
suggesting that this may be the source of the trade-off explaining average job 
satisfaction in the face of lower earnings. With respect to overskilling, there 
was nothing to suggest that such workers were trading off lower pay for other 
job attributes, the only significant result relating to a lower likelihood of 
opting for jobs because they presented new challenges. It is worth pointing out 
that neither the opportunity to learn new skills or improve career prospects 
were important for mismatched workers, adding further weight to the evidence 
rejecting explanations of mismatch centred around theories of career 
advancement (McGuinness and Wooden, 2009). Proponents of the 
occupational mobility based hypothesis (Rosen 1972; Sicherman and Galor 
1990) predict that workers may deliberately enter their preferred profession at 
a level lower in order to acquire the necessary skills, through on-the-job 
training and learning, that will enable them to achieve more rapid career 
progression in the future. Clearly, the evidence presented here refutes this, as 
 
none of the controls relating to learning or career progression were significant 
for either overeducation or overskilling. 
Some significant differences were apparent when the models were re-
estimated according to gender.  Overeducated males were found to be more 
likely to opt for jobs that allow a balance with family life and they tend to 
place a lower emphasis on high earnings, demonstrating clear evidence of a 
compensating wage effect.  Overskilled males were found to less likely to 
  13place a high importance on and be employed in jobs that had a societal value 
or were career progressing (Tables 6a and 6b). With respect to overeducated 
females, job security was found to be a key motivating factor underlying job 
choice. The absence of a significant family balance effect among females is 
somewhat surprising; however, this may be facilitated primarily through the 
increased likelihood of public sector employment which tends to be more 
flexible with respect to a  balance.  No significant effects 
were found with respect to overskilled females (Tables 7a and 7b). 
< Insert Table 5a > 
< Insert Table 5b > 
< Insert Table 6a here > 




                                                











ble 7a here> 
 
< Insert Table 7b here> 
 
Finally we attempt to establish the specific skill competencies that, when 
constrained, lead to lower wages in the case of male graduates and lower 
levels of job satisfaction for all graduates.  The REFLEX questionnaire asks 
respondents to rank their ability levels in 19 competency areas
8 on a seven 
point scale and  subsequently to assess the extent to which the competency is 
required in their current post using a similar rating system. Respondents were 
also asked to identify their three strongest areas of competency from the list. 
 
8 The competency fields are (1) mastery of own discipline (2) knowledge of other disciplines (3) 
analytical thinking (4) ability to acquire new knowledge  (5) ability to negotiate (6) ability to perform 
under pressure (7) alertness to new opportunities (8) ability to coordinate activities  (9) ability to use 
time effectively  (10) ability to work productively with others (11) ability to mobilise the capabilities of 
others (12) ability to make your meaning clear to others (13) ability to assert your authority (14) ability 
to use computers and the internet (15) ability to come up with new ideas and solutions (16) willingness 
to question your own ideas and others (17) ability to present products and ideas (18) ability to write 
reports etc.  (19) ability to write and speak in a foreign language.  
  14We define an individual as overskilled in a particular area if the competency is 
identified as a strong point and the level of skill required in the job is two or 
more rating scores below the level of acquired skill.  We re-estimate the job 
satisfaction and wage equations with these additional variables in order to 
 
 approximately 15 per cent.  The lack of 
a negative wage effect suggests that the remainder of the negative female 
overskilling effect is ation in other unobserved 
competencies and / or general ability. 
< Insert Table 8 here > 
assess the sensitivity of the overall penalties to the inclusion of the individual 
mismatch controls. 
The re-estimated job satisfaction model is shown in table 8. With respect to 
the individual overskilling controls in specification 2, the results indicate that 
overall job satisfaction is lower where graduates are unable to utilise all their 
field specific knowledge and engage in analytical thinking. However, workers 
with surplus computer related skills are found to have higher levels of job 
satisfaction, suggesting that some value is placed on an ability to keep pace 
with technical progress in a work context. When the general overskilling and 
overeducation controls are re-introduced into the model, the general job 
satisfaction penalty of 23 per cent remains unchanged, suggesting that the 
individual overskilling variables are not effectively identifying the causes of 
lower job satisfaction. However, the situation alters somewhat when the 
sample is again split according to gender.  The positive return to surplus 
computer skills appears to be specific to males; furthermore there is evidence 
of a positive return to surplus language skills among males and, as a 
consequence of these two effects, the overall overskilling penalty for male 
graduates actually increases from 25 to 30 per cent when the competency 
specific controls are included. This suggests that lower male job satisfaction 
relates either to (a) factors not included in the competency list relating, 
presumably, to general ability, or (b) the lower wage penalty associated with 
overskilling.  The situation for females is somewhat different, with a negative 
impact of under used language and field specific competencies reducing the 
overskilling job satisfaction penalty by
 related to under-utilis
 




all graduates as a consequence of overskilling are likely to relate to an 
eneral intellect as opposed to any specific set of skills. 
5. 
 
r some graduates may 
ave chosen certain jobs which are “non-graduate” because they offer 
< Insert Table 9 here > 
The re-estimated male wage equation is presented in table 8. There are 
negative wage effects associated with an inability to use field specific skills 
and the ability to question ideas. However, when these individual effects are 
included in the model the overskilling pay penalty falls only marginally. 
Interestingly, the overeducation pay penalty declines by 20 per cent, 
demonstrating the importance of these skills in the context of explaining the 
effects of educational mismatch.  Given the comprehensive nature of the 
controls used in this study, the results suggest that the productivity constraint 
placed on male graduates and the lower job satisfaction levels experienced
inability to utilise g
 
Conclusions 
There has been a substantial increase in the number of graduates emerging 
from Higher Education Institutions in the UK and this has raised questions 
about the ability of the labour market to absorb them. As data based on 
subjective responses from employed graduates suggest not only that a 
substantial proportion of graduates are in jobs for which a degree is not 
required, but also that this proportion has been increasing over time some have 
expressed concern that the UK may be producing too many graduates. Care 
must be taken, however, in interpreting these results and our data set, 
REFLEX enables us not only to distinguish between over-(and under-) 
education and over-(and under-) skilling, and analyse their effects on both 
earnings and job satisfaction, but also to consider whethe
h
compensating advantages which offset their lower pay. 
 
We find there are large wage penalties for being in a job for which one is 
currently overeducated and a substantial, but smaller, wage penalty for being 
  16overskilled. However, only males suffer a significant wage loss as a 
consequence of current overskilling. These results remain after using a 
propensity score matching model to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Further, when both educational and skills mismatch variables are included in a 
job satisfaction question it is overskilling which has the stronger negative 
effect on job satisfaction, with the overeducation variable being significant 
only at the 90% for women. This is suggestive of the presence of a trade-off 
between earnings and other aspects of employment. Further light is cast on 
this by utilising a series of questions on job characteristics within the REFLEX 
data set. We have information both on whether a particular job characteristic is 
present and, if so, what value the individual employee places on it. Thus, 
overeducated workers are more likely to be in jobs that offer greater security, 
which they also tend to value highly, whereas no such factors are present for 
overskilled workers. Further, over-educated men are more likely to opt for, 
and value highly, jobs which offered a greater balance with family life and this 
group also placed a lower emphasis on high earnings. Thus, the balance of 
evidence points to a trade-off between being employed in jobs with graduate 
level requirements or selecting those with compensating job attributes. As no 
such trade-off is found for skill mismatching it is on overskilling that the 
policy focus should centre as this represents welfare losses both to the 
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le 1: Wage eq  with ucation, undereducation, overskilling and 
underskilling controls 
 
(  (  
Tab uations  overed
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  5) 6)
VARIABLES  F Model Model Model Model Males  emales 
        
Male  0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 
0  
on  -0.15** -0.13** -0.15** -0.14**  -0.17** 




-0.12*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.09***  -0.09** 





0   .09** -  - 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  -  - 
Labexp  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***  .01*** 0.00** 
  (0.00) 
-
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
0  
(0.00) 
Age  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  .01* 0.00 




  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.08) 
Human  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.14 -0.03 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) 
Social  0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.01 









Science 0.05  0.06  0.05  0.06 0.10 







- Agvet -0.23*  0.20* -0.22*  0.20* 0.05  0.33 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.20) 
Health 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.02 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) 
Mast  0.13** 0.10 0.13** 0.10  0.11  0.08 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
First  0.14** 0.12** 0.15** 0.13**  .23***  0.04 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
0  
(0.08) 
Twoone  0.08** 0.06* 0.08** 0.06*  .10** 0.02 




  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
0   Supervise  0.05  .09**
  (0.03) 
0  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
fieldmatchnow  .11** 0.00  0.05  -0.01  -0.12  0.07 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
-
(0.08) (0.07) 
- fieldrelatednow 0.06  -0.04 0.00  0.05 0.01  0.08 









- fieldmatchj 0.07  0.07  0.06  0.06 -0.00  0.12 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
 
(0.08) 
fieldrelatedjo 0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.00  0.15** 0.08 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
-
(0.06) 
Coursemp  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
coursep 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08***  0.08*  0.11** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
coursevo 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
  18Hours  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
9 
999 
0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.22*** 
-0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.18*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
s  -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 





-0.22***  -0.10*  -0.15** 
0.09***  0.08** 
b1 
nderskilljob1  0.02  0.00  -0.07  0.10* 
6.44*** 6.56*** 6.48*** 6.55*** 6.37*** 6.68*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.23) (0.20) 
        
Observations  1023 1023 1023 1023  392  631 
R-squared  0.27 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.50 0.29 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rdfirm  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
size5099  0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
size10024 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
size250 0.09* 0.10** 0.09*  0.10*  0.06  0.08 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
size1000  0.10**  0.05 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
Public  -0.08* 
 
numemployer -0.01* 0.01  -0.01 
 
overednow    .39***   .34*** 0.31***
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
underednow   -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.11 
   (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Overedjob1    .0  -0.07  -0.11*  -0.05 
    04  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
underedjob1    03  0.03  0.13  -0.12 
    09  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.15) 
overskillnow     -0.01 
      (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
underskillnow     0.06  0.08 
      (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
overskilljo     0.00  0.04  -0.05  0.10* 
      (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
u    











  19Table 2: Marginal effects from probits - Propensity Score Models 
Overskilling Overeducation   
Males  F   F  
 0   0.13***  0
 
      
VARIABLES All  emales All  Males  emales
         
overskilljob1 .11*** .08**  -0.01  -0.03  -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
underskilljob1 
job1  0.04  -0.01  0   0.22 **  0.13









atchnow  -0 * -  -0  -0   -0  -0  
now  -0 * -  -0  -0 *  -  -0 * 
rest  -0  -   -0  
 
0.02 0.06 0.00 0.02  0.04 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.03) 
overed -0.00  .16*** * *** 
  (0.02)  05 03 (0.03) 
undered -0.06  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.09 
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06)  (0.00) (0.17) 
male 0.04**     0.02    
  (0.02)    (0.02)     
labexp  .00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
age  0.00* 0.01** -0.00  .00** .01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
educati 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01  0.00 0.00 
  (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.03) 
human  0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.00  -0.02 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.07) (0.03) 
social  0.03 -0.00 0.06 0.02  0.02 0.01 
  (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) 
science 0.03 -0.02 0.30 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.29) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.00) 
agvet  0.05 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.02  0.52* 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.00) (0.11)  (0.09) (0.28) 
health -0.03  -0.05 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
  (0.06) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
mast  0.04 -0.00 0.07 0.02  0.13 -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.03) 
first  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01  0.01 -0.00 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.03) 
twoone  -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01  -0.03 -0.00 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
numemplo -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) 
unemp 0.05**  0.05  0.05**  0.04*  0.03  0.04* 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
supervise  -0.04**  -0.06 -0.03 -0.01  -0.02 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.01) 
fieldm .11** 0.11*** .11*** .10*** .09*** .10***
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
fieldrelated .12** 0.13*** .12*** .14** 0.15*** .11**
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.03) 
hours  0.00 0.00* -0.00 -0.00  0.00* -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp  0.03 0.11** -0.02  0.04  0.09** 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.02) 
coursep -0.05***  .09*** 0.05** -0.05***  .11*** -0.03* 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
coursevoc -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 
  20  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (
firm 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
ze5099  -
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) 
ze100249  -
ze250999 
(  (  (   (0.06) (0.02) 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.02) 
public  -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01  0.00 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Observations  1056  406 583 994  371 597 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.23 0.24 0.25 0.34  0.38 0.36 
0.02) 
rd -0.03**  -0.04 -0.03  -0.03** -0.04 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.02) 
si -0.03  0.09**  0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.02) 
si -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.06**  0.00 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.04) 
si 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 -0.00 
  (0.03)  0.07) 0.04) 0.03)
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Table 3: OLS & Propensity Score Model Estimates of Overskilling Wage Effect 
 
   
 
 
 O   Overeducation  verskiling
OLS  -0.22*** -0.39*** 
N Neighbour  -0.26*** -0.40*** 
Radius  -0.25*** -0.40*** 


























  22Table 4: Probit estim s of Job sfaction h overe ation & skillin
 
BLES  F  
 
ate  Sati  wit duc  over g 
controls 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (  
Males 
5) (6) 
emales VARIA All All All All 
         
male -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01     
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)     
labexp  0  0  0   0
on 
 
  -  
0  




0  0  0  0  0   0  













































  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)  (0.09) 
science -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.00  -0.29 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17)  (0.23) 
agvet  -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.02  -0.23 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21)  (0.22) 
health -0.19*  0.20** -0.19*  -0.19*  -0.22  -0.19* 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.22)  (0.11) 
mast  -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08  -0.08 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)  (0.10) 
f
 



























  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)  (0.04) 
s
 





















(   0.05)
0.01 




  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)  (0.06) 
fieldm .22*** .22*** .26*** .24*** 0
(0.11) 
.28**  0.22**
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.09) 
fieldrelated -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)  (0.06) 
hours  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
coursemp  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03  0.06 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)  (0.05) 
coursep 0.08***  0.06*  0.06*  0.05  0.04  0.06 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)  (0.04) 









(   0.04)
.14***




  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.04) 
size5099  -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.12 





(0. )  (0. ) 
ublic  0.10 ** 0 0.09 ** 0  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)  (0.04) 
umemployers  -0 0  -0 1 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) 




nderednow  -0 3 
(0. 7) 
nderedjob1  -0 6 
(0. 0) 
verskillnow  -  -  -  
verskilljob1  -0.10**  -0.10** 
(   (0.06) 
ow  0  0   0.14** 
      (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)  (0.05) 
underskilljob1      -0.03 -0.02 -0.02  -0.04 
      (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)  (0.06) 
Observations  1056 1056 1056 1056  406  650 
R-squared  0.08 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.20  0.12 
 
0.11)  (0.08) 
si -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.08 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)  (0.08) 
si 0.11**  -0.10* -0.11* -0.10*  0.03 -0.16** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  0.10)  (0.07) 
si -0.08* -0.07 -0.07* -0.07  0.05  -0.12** 
  04 (0.04)  04 (0.04) (0.07)  (0.05) 
p * .10***  * .10*** 0.11*  0.10** 
 
n .0 -0.00  .0 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 
 
o   0.27***   0.17*** -0.24**  -0.14* 
   (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
o   -0.01    0.03  0.02  0.03 
    0  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
u   .0  -0.05  -0.12  0.01 
    0  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
u   .0  -0.06  -0.11  0.01 
    1  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
o     0.30*** 0.25*** 0.31*** -0.20** 
      (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)  (0.08) 
o     -0.12*  -0.10 
      (0.04) (0.05)  0.07)
















  24Table 5a: Job Characteristic Probits – All  workers 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES F   Security  Ea s  amily rning Learning  Status 
         




-0 1  0.02 
(0. 2)  (0.03) 




-0   -0.02** 
-0.03*** 









0.04*** .08** -0.01  -0.03  0.01 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
labexp -0.00  0.00*  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
age  .00** 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
educati -0.01  0.07  0.01  -0.05  0.00 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
human  0.01 0.01 0.03  -0.05  0.04 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
social  -0.01 -0.01  .0 -0.05 
  (0.03) (0.06)  0 (0.05) 
science .06*** 0.01  -0.03  0.05 
  (0.01) (0.08)  0 (0.07)  (0.06) 
agvet 0.06  -0.07     
  (0.08)  (0.09)   (0.07)  
health -0.02  0.04    0.03  -0.00 
 (0.03)  (0.08)    (0.08)  (0.03) 
mast 0.02  -0.11**  .05*** 0.00 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
first 0.04  -0.08*  -0.00  0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
twoone  0.00  -0.02  0.07** -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
unemp  -0.00  0.06* -0.01 -0.04 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
supervise  0.03* 0.04  0.01  -0.01  -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
fieldmatchnow  0.01 0.07 0.04  0.08*  0.01 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
fieldrelated 0.01  0.01  -0.00  0.01  0.01 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
hours  .00** 0.00  .00*** 0.00  0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
coursemp 0.02  -0.02  0.03*  -0.00  0.03* 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
coursep 0.02 0.02 0.01  0.01  0.00 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
coursevoc 0.01  0.03  -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
rdfirm  -0.01  -0.00  0.01  .08*** 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
size5099  0.01 0.08 0.03  0.04  0.05 
  (0.02) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
size10024 -0.03  0.02  -0.03*  -0.04  0.01 
  25  (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
size250999 
-  
0   0  
rs  0   -   -0.00 
verskillnow  -0.00 -0.03 -0.02  -0.07*  -0.03*** 
0.11** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03) 













-0.05***  -0.02  0.01  -0.04  -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
size1000  0.05*** -0.07**  -0.01  -0.05  -0.03* 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
public  .04*** .14*** 0.00  0.07**  0.04*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
numemploye .00** 0.03*** -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
o
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
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Table 5b: Job haracteris ic Probits – All Worke  C t rs 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  Leisure  Career  Autonom  Useful  Chall 
        















-   0.06**  0.06** 
rest 
  -0.06** 
0.09*** 
-0.04  -0.02  0.03  -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) 
labexp  0.00** 0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
age 0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
educati -0.03  0.05  0.03  -0.04  -0.01 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) 
human  -0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01  0.01 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) 
social -0.06  0.05  0.01  -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
science -0.05  0.02  -0.00  -0.08  0.02 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.08) 
agvet  .12*** -0.02 -0.08 -0.03   
  (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08)   
health -0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.07) 
mast -0.00  -0.05  -0.07**  0.02  -0.03 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.05) 
first 0.04  0.01  -0.04  0.06  0.04 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.05) 
twoone  0.03  -0.02  .06** -0.02  -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.03) 
unemp -0.00  0.03  -0.04*  0.00 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
supervise 0.02  0.01  0.04*  0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
fieldma -0.01  0.04  0.08**  -0.00  0.04 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) 
fieldrelated -0.07**  0.00  0.02  -0.01  -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) 
hours -0.00  .00** 0.00*  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
coursemp  0.06** -0.01  0.04 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) 
coursep 0.04*  0.01  0.01  -0.04  0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
coursevoc -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) 
rdfirm 0.01  -0.01  0.04*  0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
size5099  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06  0.09* 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) 
  27size100249 
999 
-0 * 
0.21*** 0.05** 0.06***  0.08*** 
rs 
verskillnow  -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.02 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) 













-0.01  0.10*  -0.03  0.02  -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.05) 
size250 -0.06**  -0.02 -0.03 -0.00  -0.06 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.04) 
size1000  .11** 0.05  -0.02  -0.01  -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) 
public  0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
numemploye 0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
o
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.04) 




























  28 
Table 6a:  Chara stic Pro  - Mal  Job cteri bits es 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
VARIABLES  S   Earnings L   Family  ecurity earning Status 
        







(0. 1) ( (
ocial -0 0 
( ( (0. )  (0. 4) 
cience  -0.00  0.02 
(0. )  (0.10) (0.06) 
gvet 0. 4 
ealth 
ast  -   -0.03** 
rst 
( (

















( ( (0.05) (0.01) 





0.00  0.00**  0.00**  -0.00 
  0.00)  0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
a 0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.00)  0.00)  0.00)  (0.00)  0.00) 
e 0.00  0.29  -0.02  -0.04  -0.03 
  (0.02)  0.19) (0.02)  (0.11) (0.02) 
h -0.01 0.12 0.00  -0.04 0.00 
  0 0.14) (0.03)  (0.11)  0.04) 
s .0 0.10  -0.01  -0.14  -0.00 
  0.01)  0.15)  02 (0.09)  0
s   0.14  -0.08 
    (0.17)  02
a 0 0.00    -0.08   
  (0.08)  (0.15)   (0.10)  
h   -0.09    0.11   
   (0.09)   (0.19)  
m -0.00  0.13*** -0.02*  -0.05 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.07) (0.01) 
fi 0.03  -0.04  0.01  -0.06  -0.02 
  (0.05) (0.06)  0.02)  (0.06)  0.02) 
tw -0.00  0.09** -0.02 -0.07  -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.04)  0.01)  (0.04) (0.02) 
u -0.01 -0.04 0.00  -0.07 0.01 
  0.01) (0.04)  0.01)  (0.04)  0.02) 
s -0.01 0.07* 0.01 -0.00 0.03* 
  0.01)  0.04)  0.01)  (0.04)  0.02) 
fi 0.04  -0.00  0.04  0.18**  0.05 
  (0.03) (0.06)  0.04)  (0.07)  0.04) 
fi 0.00 0.03 0.01  0.10*  0.02 
  (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)  (0.06)  0.02) 
h -0.00 -0.00 0.00  -0.00 0.00 
  0.00)  0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  0.00) 
c -0.01 -0.04 -0.01  -0.03 0.02 
  (0.01)  0.04)  0.01) 
c 0.00  0.02  -0.00  -0.04  0.00 
  0.01) (0.04)  0.01)  (0.04)  0.02) 
c -0.01  0.03  0.01  0.02  -0.02 
  (0.01)  0.05)  0.01) 
rd 0.01  0.08**  0.00  0.01 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
s -0.00  0.09  0.08  0.12  0.22* 
  (0.01) (0.09)  0.07)  (0.10)  0.13) 
s -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02  0.11 









(0.01) (0.05) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.02) 
0   -0.01  -0.02* 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01)  (0.07) (0.04) 













0.01)  (0.09)  0.11) 
s -0.01 -0.06 0.01  -0.07 0.12 
  0.01)  0.05) (0.03)  (0.06) (0.09) 
s -0.04*  -0.06 0.01  -0.00 0.04 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.01)  (0.05)  0.03) 
p 0.00  0.06  -0.01  -0.01  0.07** 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.04) (0.03) 
n -0.00 -0.02 -0.00  -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
o -0.01 -0.07 -0.00  -0.09*  -0.02 
 




































  30Table 6 ob Char ristic Pro  Males  b: J acte bits
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  L Autonomy  Challeng  Useful  eisure  Career 




(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 





(0.11) (0.07) (0.18) (0.06)  (0.06) 
cience  -0.12***  -0.09* 
(0.14) (0.08) (0.21) (0.04) 
gvet 
(
ealth  -  
( (0.10) 
ast 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
rst - -
( (
oone  -  
( ( (
nemp 







ours  - -0.00** 





oursevoc -  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04) 
firm  0.15*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
ize5099 
ize100249 
-0.00  0.00 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 
  0.00) (0.00)  0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
a 0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00) 
e 0.12 -0.02 0.21 -0.08 
  0.13) (0.08)  0.21) (0.06)  (0.05) 
h 0.05 -0.09 0.27 -0.07  -0.10 
  0.09) (0.08)  0.18) (0.08)  (0.08) 
s 0.07 -0.07 0.15 -0.10  -0.11* 
 
s 0.10  -0.05  0.18 
  (0.05) 
a 0.04 -0.03 0.11 -0.04   
  (0.15) (0.09) (0.23)  0.08)   
h 0.34  0.11*** 0.05  -0.02  -0.03 
  (0.25)  0.03) (0.21) (0.10) 
m -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 
  (0.06) 
fi 0.06**  0.02  0.10**  0.18*  0.03 
  (0.03)  0.07) (0.04)  0.10)  (0.07) 
tw 0.01  0.02  0.10*** 0.00  -0.01 
  0.03)  0.04)  0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) 
u -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03  -0.02 
  (0.03)  0.04) (0.04)  0.04) 
s 0.03 0.01 0.04  0.08**  0.06* 
  (0.03)  0.04)  0.04)  0.04)  (0.04) 
fi -0.05 0.08 0.14* 0.02 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.06)  0.07) (0.05)  (0.06) 
fi -0.03 0.05 0.09 0.05  -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
h -0.00  0.00**  0.00  -0.00 
 
c -0.01 -0.02 -0.01  -0.06*  0.01 
  (0.03) (0.04)  0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) 
c 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01  0.02 
  0.03) (0.04)  0.04)  0.04)  (0.04) 
c 0.07*** -0.02  0.01  0.10**  -0.05 
 
rd 0.01 0.06* 0.03  0.03 
  (0.04) 
s 0.07  -0.02  0.15  0.05  0.16 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)  (0.10) 
s 0.01 0.16 0.11 -0.03  -0.05 
  (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06)  (0.06) 
  31size250999  -  
( ( (0.05) 
ize1000 -  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
ublic 0  
(
umemployers 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
verskillnow -  
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)  (0.06) 













0.08*** -0.05 -0.08 -0.02  -0.06 
  (0.02) (0.05)  0.05)  0.06) 
s 0.12*** 0.07*  -0.01  -0.02  -0.00 
  (0.04) 
p .18*** 0.09**  0.01  0.03  0.06 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  0.04)  (0.04) 
n 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00  -0.00 
 
o 0.08*** -0.03  -0.08*  0.01  -0.04 
 





































  32Table 7a ar P em : Job Ch acteristic  robits – F ales 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  Security  Earnings  Learning  Family  Status 
         
labexp 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
ge 




( ( (0.04) 
ocial  0.01 
(0.04)  (0. ) (0. 7)  (0.04) 
cience -0.0 **  0.08  0.23 






rst  -0.03*** 
(0.06)  (0.01) 
oone 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
nemp 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
upervise  -0.03** 
(0.02) 
eldmatchnow 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
eldrelatednow 
( (0.02) 
ours - 0  
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
oursemp 0.06* 
(0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.02) 
ourseprest 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
oursevoc 
(0.03)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.02) 
firm 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
ize5099 
(
ize100249  -0.03** 
ize250999 -   -0.03** 
-0.00  0.00  -0.00*  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00) 
a 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01**  0.00 
  (0.00)  0.00) (0.00) 
e -0.02 0.03 0.01  -0.08 0.01 
  (0.04)  (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) 
h 0.03  -0.02  0.03  -0.06  0.05 
  (0.05)  (0.07)  0.03)  0.06) 
s -0.02  -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 
  (0.07)  02 0
s 8 -0.12   
  (0.04)   
a   -0.05       
   (0.17)       
h -0.01  0.10  0.03  0.03 
  0.05)  (0.10)   0.09)  (0.05) 
m 0.06 -0.08    0.07 -0.02 
  0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.02) 
fi 0.07  -0.09  -0.01  0.09 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) 
tw 0.01  -0.06 -0.02 -0.06  -0.02 
  (0.03)  (0.02) 
u 0.01  -0.06 -0.02 -0.03  0.01 
  (0.03)  (0.02) 
s -0.03  0.02  -0.01  -0.03 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.01) 
fi -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
  (0.04)  (0.02) 
fi 0.02  -0.01 -0.02 -0.04  -0.01 
  (0.03)  (0.05) (0.02)  0.05) 
h 0.00**  0.00  .00*** 0.01**  0.00** 
 
c -0.02  0.06**  0.02  0.02 
 
c 0.03  0.03 0.02 0.05  0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.01) 
c 0.01  0.05  -0.01  -0.06  0.02 
 
rd -0.03  0.04  0.01  0.09**  -0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.01) 
s 0.01 0.05  -0.01  0.00 0.03 
  (0.04)  (0.07)  0.03) (0.07)  (0.03) 
s -0.03  0.06  -0.09  -0.00 
  (0.03)  (0.08) (0.02) (0.06)  (0.02) 
s 0.07*** -0.02  0.00  -0.02 
  33  (0.02)  (0.06) ( (0.01) 
ize1000  -0.09** -0.03 -0.09**  -0.05*** 
ublic  0.07***  0.19*** 0.01 0.13*** 
(0.02)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.01) 
umemployers  -0.03**  -0.01** 
(0.00)  (0.01) 
verskillnow 
(0.05)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
0.17**  -0.02 
(0.05)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06)  (0.04) 















  (0.03)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.02) 
p 0.02 
 
n 0.01*  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
o 0.04  0.02  -0.00  -0.06   
   
overednow 0.01  -0.09  0.02 
 





































  34Table 7 Cha tic P em
 
b: Job  racteris robits F ales 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES  Autonom  Challengin  Useful  Leisure  Career 
        
labexp - -0.00**  -0.00** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ge  0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ducation 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
uman 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 









(0.08)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
oone 
( (
nemp  -   -0.07** 
(0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 





(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ours 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
oursemp  0   0.14*** 0.06 




(0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
firm 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ize5099 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
ize100249  -0.07** 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
ize250999 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
ize1000  -
0.00**  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00) 
a 0.00*  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.00) 
e -0.05  0.05  -0.00  -0.04  0.03 
  (0.06) 
h -0.06  0.11  -0.00  0.00  0.03 
  (0.06) 
s -0.09  08 .0 0.01  0.02 
  (0.06)  (0.08) (0.05)  0.07)  0.07) 
s -0.06      0.04  0.19 
  0.15)      (0.17)  (0.23) 
h -0.05  -0.02  -0.05  0.01  0.04 
 
m 0.02  -0.03  0.08** -0.01  -0.06 
  0.08)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
fi 0.13  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 
 
tw 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
  0.04)  (0.04) (0.03)  0.03) (0.04) 
u 0.02  0.05  0.08*** -0.01 
 
s 0.00  -0.02  0.01  -0.00 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
fi 0.01  0.01  0.08*  -0.01  0.06 
  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05)  0.05) (0.06) 
fi 0.09**  -0.04  0.00  -0.05  -0.02 
  (0.04) 
h -0.00  -0.00*  0.00** 0.00 0.01** 
  (0.00) 
c -0.06  0.00  .11***
 
c 0.07*  0.02  0.01  -0.05*  0.04 
  0.03)  (0.03)  0.03)  0.03) (0.03) 
c 0.00  0.00  -0.04  -0.05  -0.07* 
 
rd 0.02  -0.06*  0.04  0.02  0.06* 
  (0.03) 
s 0.05  0.08 0.00 0.07 0.04 
  (0.07) 
s -0.00  0.08  0.04  -0.03 
  (0.06) 
s -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 
  (0.05) 
s 0.10**  0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 
  35  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
ublic  0   0   0  
(0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
umemployers 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
verskillnow 
(0.07)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
-0.07*  -0.08*  -0.13*** 
(0.06)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 













p .23*** 0.04  .09*** 0.03  .09***
 
n -0.00  0.00 0.02* 0.00  0.01 
  (0.01) 
o 0.04  0.02 0.04 0.05  0.13* 
 




























  36Table 8: Job Satisfaction equation wi mpeten ased ove ling con  
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
th co cy b rskil trols
 
 
VARIABLES  Males Fem les  Model Model Model  a
         
male 0.07*  0.06*  0
p 
n 
  0  
(0.07) 
  0.35*** 




0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01*** 
  -0.08** 
oc 
.08**     
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)     
labex -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
age  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.01  -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
educatio 0.10  0.10  0.12*  0.18  0.09 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.14)  (0.08) 
human 0.12*  0.12*  .14** 0.13  0.12 
  (0.06) (0.07)  (0.15)  (0.08) 
social  0.06 0.06 0.08  0.10  0.07 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.15)  (0.09) 
science 0.04 0.05 0.06  0.01 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.10) 
agvet  0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
health -0.17 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.23)  (0.08) 
mast 0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.03  0.01 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
first  0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.09 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.08) 
twoone  0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.07 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
unemp  0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.08* 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
supervise  -0.00 -0.00 -0.01  -0.05  -0.00 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
fieldmatchnow -0.09  -0.04  -0.10  -0.11 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.08) 
fieldrelatednow  0.07*  .12*** 0.06 0.14* 0.02 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
fieldmatchjob1  0.03  -0.02  0.03 0.06 0.05 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.08) 
fieldre 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.07 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.06) 
hours  -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
coursemp  -0.03 -0.04 -0.04  -0.06  -0.00 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
courseprest -0.02  0.00  -0.02  0.09 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
coursev 0.02 0.04 0.03  0.04  0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
rdfirm  -0.04 -0.03 -0.04  -0.03  -0.04 
  37  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
size5099  -0.04 -0.04 -0.03  -0.08  0.01 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
size100249  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01  0.05  -0.04 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
size250999 
0  0  
-0.06* -0.06* -0.06*  -0.12*** 
loyers  0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 









-0   -0.23***  -0.30***  -0.20** 
 
0.02 0.04 0.04 0.16* -0.01 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
size100 0.07* 0.06 0.07*  .15** 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
public  0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
numemp 0.02  0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.01) 
osownf   0.18* -0.14  -0.09 
    (0.11)  (0.11) (0.15)  1
osothf   0.19  0.22  0.26   
   (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.16)   
osanal    -0.17*  -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 
    (0.09)  (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) 
osackn    -0.10  -0.09  .1 -0.08 
    (0.11)  (0.11)  2 (0.15) 
osnegot    0.23  0.27  0.15 
    (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.36) 
ospress   0.01  0.02  0.09  -0.05 
    (0.14)  (0.14) (0.19) (0.21) 
osalert   0.08  0.05  0.16  -0.06 
    (0.20)  (0.21) (0.25) (0.41) 
oscoord   0.06  0.02  -0.32  0.13 
    (0.17)  (0.18) (0.43) (0.20) 
ostime   -0.13  -0.12  0.01  -0.06 
    (0.14)  (0.14) (0.23) (0.22) 
oswoth   -0.22  -0.26*  -0.25  -0.25 
    (0.14)  (0.14) (0.23) (0.23) 
oscmean    -0.24  -0.20 -0.15 -0.30 
    (0.22)  (0.23) (0.41) (0.29) 
oscompu   0.16*  .18**  0.14 
    (0.09)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) 
ossolut   -0.14  -0.16  0.04  -0.24 
    (0.16)  (0.16) (0.31) (0.20) 
osquest   0.10  0.13 0.16 0.14 
    (0.11)  (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) 
ospres    -0.12  -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 
    (0.11)  (0.11) (0.22) (0.15) 
oswrite   -0.06  -0.05  0.02  -0.11 
    (0.11)  (0.12) (0.19) (0.16) 
oslang   .0 -0.09  0.27*  -0.24** 
    1 (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) 
overskillnow  .23***  
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
underskillnow -0.01    -0.01  0.00  -0.04 
  38  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
overskilljob1 0.07*    0.07  -0.03  0.14** 
1 
nderedjob1  -0.13  -0.14 -0.21 -0.05 
(   (0.16) 
         
Observations  1056 1050 1050  402  641 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
underskilljob -0.05    -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
overednow  -0.07    -0.07 -0.13 -0.06 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.08) 
overedjob1  -0.04    -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
underednow -0.03    -0.02  0.02  -0.08 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
u  

























  39Table 9: Male wage equations with competency based overskilling controls 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Model Model Model 
     
male 




(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
uman 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
cial 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
ience 
gvet 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
ealth 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
ast 
first 0.23***  0.26***  0.22** 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
twoone  0.10** 0.12** 0.10** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
unemp -0.08*  -0.12**  -0.08 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
supervise  0.05 0.07 0.05 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
fieldmatchnow  -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
fieldrelatednow  0.01 0.11* 0.01 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
fieldmatchjob1 -0.00  0.02  -0.01 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
fieldrelatedjob1  -0.15** -0.14** -0.16** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
hours  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp  -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
courseprest  0.08* 0.13*** 0.09* 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
coursevoc  0.00 0.04 0.00 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
la
  (0.00)  0.00) (0.00) 
a 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
e -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 
 
h 0.14 0.08 0.14 
 
so 0.14 0.06 0.12 
 
sc 0.10 0.05 0.07 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
a -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 
 
h 0.18 0.20 0.19 
 
m 0.11 0.16* 0.13 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
  40rdfirm -0.03  0.01  -0.03 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
size5099  0.05 0.00 0.04 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
size100249  0.07 0.03 0.05 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
size250999  0.06 0.06 0.07 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
size1000  0.22*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
public  -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.19*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
numemployers  0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
osownf   -0.27**  -0.16 
   (0.12)  (0.12) 
osothf   -0.16  -0.01 
   (0.21)  (0.20) 
osanal   -0.07  -0.06 
   (0.12)  (0.12) 
osackn   -0.12  -0.01 
   (0.16)  (0.15) 
osnegot   -0.15  -0.08 
   (0.72)  (0.69) 
ospress   -0.04  0.02 
   (0.17)  (0.16) 
osalert   0.32  0.21 
   (0.26)  (0.25) 
oscoord   -0.32  -0.17 
   (0.30)  (0.29) 
ostime   -0.13  -0.06 
   (0.17)  (0.17) 
oswoth   -0.21  -0.10 
   (0.18)  (0.17) 
osmob   -0.59  -0.36 
   (0.55)  (0.53) 
oscmean   0.00  -0.06 
   (0.31)  (0.29) 
osauth   -0.24  0.06 
   (0.33)  (0.32) 
oscompu   0.12  0.21 
   (0.15)  (0.14) 
ossolut   0.03  0.03 
   (0.25)  (0.24) 
osquest   -0.31**  -0.27** 
   (0.14)  (0.14) 
ospres   0.06  0.08 
   (0.16)  (0.15) 
oswrite   -0.17  -0.13 
   (0.17)  (0.16) 
  41oslang   0.17  0.12 
   (0.17)  (0.16) 
overskillnow -0.15**    -0.14** 
  (0.06)  (0.07) 
underskillnow  0.06  0.07 
  (0.05)  (0.05) 
overskilljob1 -0.05    -0.03 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
underskilljob1 -0.07    -0.09 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
overednow -0.31***    -0.25*** 
  (0.07)  (0.08) 
overedjob1 -0.11*    -0.12* 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
underednow -0.05    -0.02 
  (0.09)  (0.09) 
underedjob1  0.13  0.13 
  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Constant  6.37*** 6.40*** 6.37*** 
  (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) 
     
Observations  392 392 392 
R-squared  0.50 0.46 0.51 






 All  Employees  Males    Females   
Variable  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
        
wage  2659.85 1350.15 2899.85 1398.41 2509.69 1302.71 
overednow  0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.33 
underednow 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.21 
overedjob1  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 
underedjob1  0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.14 
        
overskillnow  0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.12 0.32 
underskill~w  0.26 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 
overskillj~1 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 
underskill~1  0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.18 0.39 
        
male  0.38 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
labexp  50.83 12.60 50.42 12.89 51.08 12.44 
age  29.15 6.09 29.15 6.17 29.17 6.07 
education  0.26 0.44 0.16 0.37 0.33 0.47 
human  0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 
social  0.19 0.39 0.25 0.43 0.15 0.36 
science  0.06 0.24 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.10 
agvet  0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.11 
health  0.06 0.25 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.26 
        
mast  0.08 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.25 
first  0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 
twoone  0.49 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.50 
unemp  0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.48 
supervise  0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.50 
fieldmatch~w  0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 
fieldrelat~w 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 
fieldmatch~1  0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 
fieldrelat~1 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.31 0.46 
coursemp  0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.44 
courseprest 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.50 
coursevoc  0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 
        
hours  37.53 7.91 38.84 8.38 36.75 7.53 
rdfirm  0.43 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.49 
size5099  0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 
size100249 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 
  43size250999 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36 
size1000  0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.49 
public  0.47 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.54 0.50 
numemployers  2.62 2.94 2.56 2.18 2.65 3.34 
        
familynew  0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.12 0.32 
securenew  0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.30 0.46 
earnnew  0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 
learnnew  0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 
statusnew  0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 
usefulnew  0.20 0.40 0.15 0.35 0.23 0.42 
leisnew  0.17 0.37 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.38 
careernew  0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 
autonnew  0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 



































  44Data Appendix 
 
Lwage  Gross monthly earnings in main employment logged.  
Overednow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overeducated in current job and 
zero otherwise 
Underednow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if undereducated in current job and 
zero otherwise  
Overedjob1:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overeducated in first job and zero 
otherwise 
Underedjob1:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if undereducated in first job and zero 
otherwise  
Overskillnow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in current job and zero 
otherwise 
Underskillnow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if underskilled in current job and zero 
otherwise  
Overskilljob1:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in first job and zero 
otherwise 
Underskilljob1:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if underskilled in first job and zero 
otherwise  
Male:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if Male and zero otherwise 
Labex  Number of months employed since graduation  
age: Age  in  years 
Education:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Education 
and zero otherwise 
Human:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Humanities 
and zero otherwise 
Social:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Social 
Science and zero otherwise 
Science:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Science and 
zero otherwise 
Agvet:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Agriculture 
/ Veterinary and zero otherwise 
Health:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Education 
and zero otherwise 
Mast:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if possessed a Masters degree and 
zero otherwise 
First:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if possessed a First Class degree and 
zero otherwise 
Twoone:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if possessed an Upper Second degree 
and zero otherwise 
Supervise:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if supervised staff members and zero 
otherwise 
Fieldmatchnow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if current job matched exclusively to 
field of study and zero otherwise 
Fieldrelatednow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if current job matched on own or a 
related field of study and zero otherwise 
Fieldmatchjob1:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if first job matched exclusively to 
field of study and zero otherwise 
Fieldrelatedjob1:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if first job matched on own or a 
related field of study and zero otherwise 
Coursemp:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employers were familiar with 
course and zero otherwise 
  45Courseprest:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if course was academically prestigious 
and zero otherwise 
Coursevoc:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if course was vocationally and zero 
otherwise 
Hours:  Regular contract hours per week 
RDfirm:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a research intensive 
firm and zero otherwise 
Size5099:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 50 to 99 
workers and zero otherwise 
Size100249:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 100 to 
249 workers and zero otherwise 
Size250999:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 250 to 
999 workers and zero otherwise 
Size1000:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with over 1000 
workers and zero otherwise 
Size1000:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a public sector 
organisation and zero otherwise 
Numemployers:  Number of employers since graduation 
Familynew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on family work / balance and 
employed in a job with high level of work / family balance 
Securenew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on job security and employed 
in a job with high level of job security 
Earnnew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on high earnings and 
employed in a job with high level of high earnings 
Learnnew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on learning and employed in a 
job with high level of learning 
Statusnew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on social status and employed 
in a job with high level of social status 
Usefulnew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on societal value and 
employed in a job with high level of societal value 
Leisnew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on work / leisure balance and 
employed in a job with high level of work / leisure balance 
Careernew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on career prospects and 
employed in a job with high level of career prospects 
Autonew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on autonomy and employed 
in a job with high level of autonomy 
Challnew  Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on new challenges and 
employed in a job with high level of new challenges 
Osownf:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in own field and zero 
otherwise 
Osothf:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in another field and zero 
otherwise 
Osanal:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in analytical thinking 
and zero otherwise 
Osack:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to acquire new 
knowledge and zero  
Osonegot:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to negotiate 
effectively  and zero otherwise 
Ospress:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to perform 
well under pressure and zero otherwise 
Osalert:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in alertness to new 
opportunities and zero otherwise 
  46Oscoord:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to coordinate 
activities and zero otherwise 
Ostime:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to use time 
effectively and zero otherwise 
Oswoth:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to work 
productively with others and zero otherwise 
Osmob:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to mobilize the 
capabilities of thers and zero otherwise 
Oscmean:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to make your 
meaning clear to others and zero otherwise 
Osauth:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to assert your 
authority and zero otherwise 
Oscompu:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to use 
computers and zero otherwise 
Ossolut:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to come up 
with new ideas and solutions and zero otherwise 
Osquest:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to question 
yours and others ideas and zero otherwise 
Ospres:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to present 
ideas / products to others and zero otherwise 
Oswrite:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to write 
reports memos or documents and zero otherwise 
Oslang:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to write and 
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